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CONCLUSIONS
INTRODUCTION1
• Optimal tolls are not the same for different VTT distributions and consequently for
users with different income distributions. The paper demonstrates that, for the type
of corridor studied, the higher the VTT average the higher the optimal price, the
higher the VTT dispersion the lower the optimal price and finally, the larger the
number of potential users the higher the optimal toll. Consequently, tolls should be
higher in regions with lower Gini indexes than in regions with higher Gini indexes.
• The optimal toll always triggers a traffic share according to the capacities of both
roads. Under free flow conditions the optimal toll is the one that makes users
travel only through the highway. When the capacity of the corridor is reached, this
share is slightly above its relative capacity.
• Further research topics: the use of a logit model for the users’ decision making,
the derivation of an analytical expression, or a new model for recurrent users
(commuters) who perfectly know the traffic in the corridor
METHODOLOGY2
Two hypotheses were assumed: 
• The potential users will be divided into 100 groups. Each group will
have a different VTT and a daily expenditure limit for transport
related to their income. Each potential user is equivalent to one car,
so if the group of potential users is made of one hundred users, that
means one hundred vehicles.
• The potential users are supposed not to be familiar with the traffic
conditions in the corridor. Therefore, they will decide whether they 
will travel or not, and through which road they will do it, on the basis
of the expected travel time, their VTT, the gasoline cost expected
under free flow conditions and the toll in the highway It is well
acknowledged that in order to achieve the maximum social welfare,
users must internalize the externalities they produce and do not
perceive. This is usually achieved through a toll or a tax. However,
that toll can harm low income users.
• The objective function that has to be minimized :
ܵܥ	 ൌ ܷܥ ൅ 	ܧܥ ൅ 	ܪܱܤ ൅ 		ܩܤ
• UC is the total cost that the users bear per trip in €. It is divided into
four terms which are travel time, toll, fuel cost and maintenance of
the vehicle.
• HOB is the net operating balance for the road operator either public
or private in €. It consists of the tolls paid in the highway minus the
maintenance cost in the toll highway.
Estimated Parameters
RESULTS
3
• In some countries it is fairly common to see two roads with the same
origin and destination competing in the same corridor. One of them is
usually a toll highway that offers a better quality to the users compared
to its alternative: a free parallel single road. The users thus have to
decide whether it is worth paying the toll for the advantages offered.
This problem, known as the “untolled alternative”, has been largely
studied in the academic literature. Particular attention has been paid
to calculate the optimal welfare toll that maximizes economic
efficiency.
• It is well acknowledged that in order to achieve the maximum social
welfare, users must internalize the externalities they produce and do
not perceive. This is usually achieved through a toll or a tax. However,
that toll can harm low income users. Depending on the objective
function to be optimized (e.g. maximize welfare, maximize social
equity, maximize income, etc.) the optimal toll might vary substantially
Objectives of the Paper
• Add knowledge in the area by defining a model to obtain the optimal
toll price in terms of the VTT distribution for an interurban corridor
where a toll highway and an untolled conventional road compete
Evolution of Social and Traffic (u=19; σ2=249.28)
• GB is the result for the Government responsible for maintaining the
conventional road in €. It is calculated as the taxes recovered from fuel
minus the maintenance cost of the road.
• EC represents the externalities produced by the vehicles in €. They are
the summation of environmental cost – i.e. gas emissions, noise and
so on – plus accidents.
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CASE STUDY
Variable Definition Value Source
ܸܶ ௜ܶ	
Distributions of the value of travel 
time
25 lognormal distributions with 5 
different averages (μ= 13, 16, 19, 
22 and 25€/hour) and 5 different 
variances (σ2= 84.44, 171.28, 
249.28, 324.8 and 391.95 )
Small, Winston and Yan, (2005); 
Calvo, Cortiñas and Sánchez, 
(2012) ; De Rus et al. (2010); 
Fosgerau (2006); Brownstone and 
Small (2005); Abrantes and 
Wardman (2011); Shires and De 
Jong, (2009); Ortiz and Cummins 
(2012); Nie and Liu (2010)
ܶு Highway Toll 0 – 8 € Ortega (2014)
TNPU Potential Users in the corridor 3,000 to 7,000 vehicles Kraemer et al. (2004)
Parameter Definition Value Source
ܦܫܵܶு Distance in the highway 90 km
Vassallo, Ortega, and Baeza, 
(2012)
ܦܫܵܶோ Distance in the road 100 km
Vassallo, Ortega, and Baeza, 
(2012)
ETTH
Expected Travel Time in the 
highway
120 km/h Kraemer et al. (2004)
ETTR Expected Travel Time in the road 100 km/h Kraemer et al. (2004)
ܥܣܲு Highway capacity 2,400 users/lane/hour. 2 lanes Kraemer et al. (2004)
ܥܣܲோ Road capacity 1,700 users/lane/hour. 1 lane Kraemer et al. (2004)
ܧݔݐ݁ݎ݈݊ܽ݅ݐݕܥ݋ݏݐ
Kilometer cost of the externality due 
to the gasoline consumption, noise 
and so on
0.05€/veh – km for a fuel 
consumption of 11.4 liters/100Km
Vassallo, Lopez, and Perez-
Martinez (2012)
ܣܿܿ݅݀݁݊ݐܥ݋ݏݐ Cost of accidents 0.03 €/veh – km
Vassallo, Lopez, and Perez-
Martinez (2012)
ߪ
Penalization of the exceeding travel 
time above free flow
0.3
Van den Berg and Verhoef (2011 a) 
and b)); Wardman and Ibañez 
(2012); Li, Hensher and Rose 
(2010); Carrion and Levinson 
(2012)
δ
Percentage of taxes paid due to 
fuel consumption
45 %
Ortega, Gómez and Vassallo 
(2012)
a0
Parameter to calculate gasoline 
consumption
54.70 Monzón et al. (2012)
a1
Parameter to calculate gasoline 
consumption
495.88 Monzón et al. (2012)
a2
Parameter to calculate gasoline 
consumption
-0.54 Monzón et al. (2012)
a3
Parameter to calculate gasoline 
consumption
0.004 Monzón et al. (2012)
ܴܩܨு,ܴܩܨோ
Parameter which takes into account 
the slope of the roads in gasoline 
consumption
1 (flat roads)
Monzón et al. (2012) for a slope 
between -1% and 1% 
ܦ݁݊ݏ. ܩܽݏ Gasoline density 0.753 kg/liter
Asociación Española de 
Operadores de Productos 
Petrolíferos (AOP). (2009)
ܥܥு
Maintenance cost of the toll 
highway
1.8E-04 €/veh - km
Ortega et al. (2014); Ministerio de 
Fomento (2011)
ܥܥோ Maintenance cost of the road 6.12E-05 €/veh – km
Comisión de transportes del  
Colegio de Ingenieros de Caminos 
(2002); Ministerio de Fomento 
(2011)
αH
Highway parameter to calculate the 
real travel time
1
Huntsinger and Rouphail (2011), 
Cetin et al. (2012); New York 
Metropolitan Transport Council 
(2005)
αR
Road parameter to calculate the 
real travel time
1
Huntsinger and Rouphail (2011), 
Cetin et al. (2012); New York 
Metropolitan Transport Council 
(2005)
ߚு
Highway parameter to calculate the 
real travel time
4
Huntsinger and Rouphail (2011), 
Cetin et al. (2012); New York 
Metropolitan Transport Council 
(2005)
ߚோ
Road parameter to calculate the 
real travel time
2
Huntsinger and Rouphail (2011), 
Cetin et al. (2012); New York 
Metropolitan Transport Council 
(2005)
߮
User's perception with respect to 
the cost of gasoline
0.9
Matas, Raymond and Ruiz (2012); 
Huang and Burris (2013)
Θ Limit of expenditure in transport 0.2 Litman (2007)
ܯܥܸ Vehicle maintenance cost 0.037 €/km Ministerio de Fomento (2014)
ܩܲ Gasoline price 1.5 €/liter
Ortega, Gómez and Vassallo 
(2012)
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